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EVIDENCE - NEGLIGENCE - REs IPsA LoQUITUR - DUTY OF OccuPIER OF LAND TO UsERs OF ADJOINING HIGHWAY -While seated in his car
waiting for a traffic light to change, plaintiff was injured by the precipitation of
debris caused by an explosion within the remaining walls of a building which
defendant and his servants were razing. During the wrecking operations masses
of bricks occasionally fell on a roped-off portion of the sidewalk undtr which
ran two pipes through which gas was delivered to the building. After defendant's servants detected the escape of gas, the gas company removed the meters
and plugged the pipes in the cellar. Gas continued to escape, and defendant was
informed of its presence by his servants. Testimony indicated that defendant
ignored the situation and made no effort to investigate or to abate the danger.
Held, (I) defendant is liable for plaintiff's in juries on the theory that the
occupier of land has a duty to users of the adjoi_ning highway to keep the premises
in a safe condition; ( 2) the e_vidence was legally sufficient to -carry the case to
the jury. Frenkil 'll. lohnson, 175 Md. 592, 3 A. (2d) 479 (1939).
After expressly stating the facts from which the jury could have found, and,
presumably, did find, a breach of duty on defendant's part, the court proceeds
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 1 for the purpose of inferring the cause

1 One of the leading cases in this country on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
Howser v. Cumberland & P.R. R., 80 Md. 146, 30 A. 906 (1894), in which is cited
the classic quotation of the rule from Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3
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of the explosion, the proof of which fact, the court indicates, is unnecessary to
plaintiff's cause of action. 2 It seems that the court confuses the function of the
doctrine; for it applies the doctrine to effect the inference that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff, whereas the true
purpose of the rule is to effect the inference that defendant was negligent. Since
there are facts present in the principal case clearly indicative of defendant's
breach of the duty he owed to plaintiff, there is no reason for invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court's error, however, is not surprising in light
of the loose way in which the rule is stated and the close relation between the
element of causation and the applicability of the rule. Usually the doctrine reads
that if certain things. are true 3 "the proper and natural inference forthwith
arising is that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant's negligence." 4 What that inference is depends here on whether emphasis is placed
on the word "caused" or on the words "defendant's negligence." A much
clearer way of stating the conclusion is that the proper and natural inference
is that defendant was negligent. As for the relation between causation and the
doctrine, it appears that unless there is a causal connection between defendant's
conduct and the injury the doctrine will not apply. 5 This fact is one of the
reasons for requiring the instrumentality to be in the exclusive control of deHurl. & C. 596 at 601, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865): "There must be reasonable
evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shewn to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident
arose from want of care."
2 "Thus, it becomes immaterial for the plaintiff to prove the particular manner
whereby the free illuminating gas exploded. In any aspect of the proof, the proximate
and efficient cause of the explosion was the presence of free gas." Principal case, 17 5 Md.
592 at 602. And again: "No_r was it necessary, under the circumstances, for the
plaintiff affirmatively to establish the specific generating cause which made effective
for injury the neglect of the defendant in permitting to exist a known dangerous condition to third parties without the premises while the defendant proceeded with his
work." 175 Md. at 608. The qualification "affirmatively'' in the latter quotation is
indicative of the court's permitting the generating cause to be inferred by the jury
from the evidence under res ipsa loquitur, an admittedly unnecessary inference.
8
The requisites of the rule may be found in the quotation in note 1, supra. See
also 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., § 2509 (1923); and Carpenter, "The Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 1 UNiv. CH1. L. REv. 519 (1934). In the latter is a discussion
of the various procedural weights given to res ipsa loquitur.
4
Quoted from the principal case, 175 Md. at 606.
5
" • • • where all the facts connected with the occurrence fail to point to the
negligence of defendant as the proximate cause of the injury, but show a state of
affairs where it could with equal reasonableness and consistency be inferred that the
accident was due to a cause or causes other than the negligent act of defendant, as where
there are several persons or causes which might have produced the injury, some of
which were under the control or management • • • of the complaining party or of
third persons, and the accident may have reasonably occurred by reason of acts for
which defendant is not liable, the doctrine cannot be invoked." 45 C. J. 1213 (1919)
and cases cited.
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fendant or his servants before the doctrine can be applied. 6 Otherwise, an unjust
inference of negligence could be made despite the great possibility that a third
person might have caused the injury.7 Nonetheless, the rule does not dispense
with the general principle requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence pertaining solely to defendant's breach of duty. 8 If this truth be remembered, and the rule be stated more accurately, courts and lawyers alike will escape
the confusion which involved the court in the principal case.

See note 3, supra.
In respect to the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, the court said in Strasburger
v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85 at 91-92, 63 A. 202 (1906): "But when the plaintiff himself
shows that the injury complained of must have resulted either from the negligence
of the defendant or from an independent cause for the existence of which the defendant is in no way responsible, he cannot be permitted to recover until he excludes the
independent cause as the efficient and proximate cause of the injury. • ••" See also
Surry Lumber Co. v. Zissett, 150 Md. 494, 133 A. 458 (1926).
8 See HARPER, ToRTS, § 77 (1933); 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed. § 2509
(1923); 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE 871 (i,:906).
6
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